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Creating	the	Enemy,	Constructing	the	Threat	
The	Diffusion	of	Repression	against	the	Muslim	Brotherhood	in	the	Middle	East	
	
May	Darwich		
Forthcoming	in	Democratization		
	
Introduction	
Scholarship	 on	 the	 international	 dimensions	 of	 authoritarianism	 has	 taken	 a	 new	
dimension	with	the	 increasing	interest	 in	the	diffusion	of	autocratic	policies	and	ideas,	
which	 has	 gained	 academic	 currency.	 While	 the	 literature	 has	 identified	 some	
mechanisms	of	autocratic	diffusion,	it	has	so	far	failed	to	specify	why,	and	under	which	
conditions,	these	mechanisms	lead	to	diffusion.	The	literature	almost	exclusively	focuses	
on	 “positive”	 cases	where	autocratic	 ideas	and	policies	 spread	successfully.	There	are,	
however,	counterintuitive	cases	where	actors	do	not	adopt	particular	autocratic	policies	
despite	the	presence	of	causal	mechanisms	conducive	for	diffusion.	1		This	article	tackles	
this	 often‐unexplored	 variation	 in	 diffusion	 by	 examining	 why	 some,	 but	 not	 all,	
autocratic	regimes	converge	with	repressive	policies.	This	article	examines	this	puzzle	
with	 a	 focus	 on	 the	 variation	 in	 the	 diffusion	 of	 repression	 against	 the	 Muslim	
Brotherhood	 (MB	 thereafter)	 undertaken	 by	 authoritarian	 regimes2	across	 the	Middle	
East	after	2013.		
Following	the	2011	Arab	uprisings,	the	MB	and	its	offshoots	emerged	as	the	main	
beneficiary	of	the	destabilisation	of	several	long‐lived	authoritarian	regimes	across	the	
region.	During	the	2011	elections	in	Tunisia	after	the	overthrow	of	Ben	Ali,	the	Islamist	
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movement	 won	 40	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 seats	 in	 the	 parliament,	 with	 the	 al‐Nahda	 Party	
forming	 the	 first	 post‐revolutionary	 government.	 In	 November	 2011,	 the	 Justice	 and	
Development	Party	won	107	out	of	395	parliamentary	seats	in	Morocco.	In	2012,	the	MB	
in	Egypt—represented	by	the	Freedom	and	Justice	Party	(FJP)—won	46	per	cent	of	the	
seats	 in	 the	 parliament.	 In	 2012,	 the	MB	 candidate	Mohamed	Morsi	 became	 the	 first	
democratically‐elected	president	of	Egypt.	In	Libya,	the	Islamists	played	a	major	role	in	
the	 overthrow	 of	 Gadhafi	 and	 evolved	 into	 the	 primary	 actor	 during	 the	 transition	
period.	 In	 Yemen,	 the	 MB—predominant	 in	 the	 al‐Islah	 party—emerged	 as	 the	 main	
beneficiary	of	the	transition	following	the	overthrow	of	President	Saleh.	3		
Following	a	coup	d’état	that	removed	President	Morsi	from	power,	the	military‐
backed	 interim	 government	 in	 Egypt	 declared	 the	 MB	 to	 be	 a	 terrorist	 group	 on	 25	
December	2013.	This	declaration	had	wide	regional	reverberations.	Although	the	group	
had	 never	 been	 granted	 formal	 judicial	 authorisation	 for	 their	 decades‐long	 political	
participation,	 it	 was	 to	 some	 degree	 accepted	 both	 by	 the	 regime	 and	 society	 since	
President	Gamal	Abdel	Nasser	until	President	Hosni	Mubarak.4	The	group	was	 labelled	
neither	a	threat	to	national	security	nor	a	terrorist	organisation.	The	regime’s	claim	that	
the	 country	 is	 facing	 an	 existential	 threat	 from	 the	 MB	 not	 only	 legalises	 repressive	
policies	against	the	organisation	but	also	enables	mass	mobilisation	behind	repression.5	
	As	 labelling	 the	 Brotherhood	 as	 a	 terrorist	 organisation	 has	 been	 effective	 in	
mobilising	Egyptians	behind	the	harsh	crackdown	of	the	group,	the	Saudi	Kingdom	has	
adopted	 the	 same	 method	 to	 counteract	 the	 MB	 regionally.6	Since	 Iran’s	 Islamic	
Revolution	 (1979),	 the	 Saudi	 Kingdom	 had	 relied	 on	 a	 version	 of	 Sunni	 Islam	 to	
legitimise	 its	 regime.	 The	 rise	 of	 the	 MB	 to	 power	 in	 Egypt	 in	 the	 post‐2011	 order	
constituted	 a	 critical	 threat	 to	 the	 Kingdom’s	 distinctiveness.	 	 The	 MB,	 offering	 an	
alternative	narrative	of	Sunni	Islam,	constituted	a	source	of	identity	risk	to	the	Kingdom.	
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The	crackdown	against	the	MB	emerged	as	an	opportunity	structure	for	the	Kingdom	to	
reassert	the	superiority	of	its	Islamic	narrative.7		
On	 7	 March	 2014,	 the	 Kingdom	 designated	 the	 Brotherhood	 as	 a	 terrorist	
organisation	alongside	two	other	groups—the	Lebanese	Hezbollah	and	the	Islamic	State	
in	 Iraq	 and	 Syria	 (ISIS)—and	 attempted	 to	 form	 a	 regional	 coalition	 against	 the	 MB	
under	the	banner	of	fighting	terrorism.	The	Kingdom	exerted	considerable	pressure	on	
other	 regimes	 to	 follow	 by	 declaring	 the	 group	 as	 terrorist.	 In	 November	 2014,	 the	
United	 Arab	 Emirates	 (UAE)	 designated	 the	 Brotherhood	 local	 affiliates	 as	 terrorists.	
Despite	 Saudi	 pressure,	 Jordan,	 Bahrain,	 and	 Kuwait	 explicitly	 refused	 to	 do	 so.	 This	
article,	then,	investigates	why	some	authoritarian	regimes	supported	the	designation	of	
the	 MB	 as	 a	 terrorist	 organisation	 whereas	 others	 have	 resisted	 it	 despite	 Saudi	
pressure.	This	article	sheds	light	on	the	dynamics	leading	to	the	diffusion	of	repression	
while	focusing	on	the	discrepancy	in	the	recipient	states’	autocratic	(non‐)convergence.	
While	the	literature	has	identified	mechanisms	of	autocratic	diffusion,	this	inner	
logic	of	diffusion	remains	subject	of	debate.	Whereas	some	scholars	argue	that	ideology	
inspires	 emulation	 leading	 to	 diffusion,	 others	 argue	 that	 authoritarian	 regimes	 are	
foremost	 driven	 by	 pragmatic	 self‐interest	 related	 to	 regimes’	 quest	 for	 survival.	 The	
diffusion	of	repression	against	the	MB,	I	argue,	provides	a	compelling	case	contributing	
to	the	ideology‐interest	debate.	Although	Jordan,	Bahrain,	and	Kuwait	share	with	Saudi	
Arabia	 the	 same	 regime	 type	 and	 converging	 regional	 interests	 in	 supporting	 the	
crackdown	on	the	MB	in	Egypt,	they	varied	paradoxically	in	adopting	repression	against	
the	MB	 in	 their	domestic	spheres.	These	cases	provide	 insights	on	 the	outcome	rather	
than	 the	mechanisms	of	diffusion.	While	 the	Saudi	Kingdom	emerged	as	 an	autocratic	
regional	 power	 adopting	 coercive	mechanisms	 of	 autocratic	 diffusion,	 some	 recipient	
states	followed	its	lead	in	designating	the	MB	as	terrorist	whereas	others	resisted.		
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I	 build	 on	 the	 assumption	 that	 states	 on	 the	 receiving	 side	 of	 diffusion	 are	
primarily	 driven	 by	 self‐interest.	 Autocratic	 regime	 interest	 is	 not,	 however,	 one‐
dimensional.	 Instead,	 survival	 is	 the	 result	 of	 interaction	 between	 two	 dynamics:	 the	
regime’s	 regional	 interests	 in	 joining	 counter‐revolutionary	 efforts	 and	 domestic	
authoritarian	 structures.	 This	 article	 argues	 that	 monocausal	 approaches	 to	 diffusion	
cannot	capture	the	complexities	of	autocratic	diffusion.	It	posits	that	IR	approaches	can	
bring	novel	insights	enriching	the	research	programme	on	the	international	diffusion	of	
authoritarianism.	 Drawing	 on	 neoclassical	 realism	 (NCR)	 in	 IR	 theory,	 I	 propose	 a	
framework	 combining	 systemic	 structures	 at	 the	 regional	 level	 with	 domestic	
constraints,	 the	 interaction	 of	 which	 can	 explain	 the	 variation	 in	 the	 recipient	 states’	
behaviour	towards	the	MB.	States’	convergence	with	regional	repressive	policies	 is	the	
result	of	 interaction	between	regime	 interest	at	 the	regional	 level—which	 is	driven	by	
the	 position	 of	 the	 state	 within	 the	 region	 as	 well	 as	 its	 dependency	 on	 a	 regional	
autocratic	 power	 for	 survival—and	 the	 regime’s	 relative	 autonomy	 vis‐à‐vis	 societal	
groups.	If	regimes	enjoy	relative	autonomy	vis‐à‐vis	the	society,	they	are	likely	to	adopt	
repressive	policies	at	 the	domestic	 level	while	pursuing	 their	regional	 interests.	When	
regimes	 are,	 however,	 less	 autonomous	 from	 societal	 groups,	 they	 are	 likely	 to	 take	
foreign	policy	decisions	that	might	endanger	their	regional	interests.	
The	analysis	proceeds	as	follows.	First,	I	situate	the	topic	within	the	scholarship	
on	 the	 diffusion	 of	 autocratic	 policies,	 identifying	 a	 lacuna	 in	 theorising	 why	 policies	
spread	 in	 some	 cases	but	 not	 in	 others.	 I	 propose	 a	 theoretical	 framework	 combining	
variables	from	two	levels	of	analysis:	regime	regional	interest	and	the	regime’s	relative	
autonomy	 at	 the	 domestic	 level.	 Afterwards,	 I	 explore	 the	 role	 of	 Saudi	 Arabia	 as	 an	
autocratic	 regional	 power	 using	 coercive	 mechanisms	 in	 diffusing	 repressive	 policies	
against	 the	 MB.	 I,	 then,	 examine	 the	 convergence	 of	 the	 UAE	 with	 Saudi	 repressive	
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policies	against	the	Brotherhood	and	contrast	it	with	the	non‐convergence	in	the	cases	
of	Jordan,	Bahrain,	and	Kuwait.	
Interest	and	Ideology	in	the	Diffusion	of	Autocratic	Policies	
The	 literature	 on	 the	 international	 dimensions	 of	 authoritarianism	 has	 adopted	 a	
number	of	concepts	and	mechanisms	from	the	democratisation	literature.8	One	of	these	
concepts	is	“diffusion,”	which	refers	to	the	transmission	of	ideas,	institutions,	policies,	or	
behaviour	 from	 one	 actor	 to	 another.	 Strang	 states	 that	 diffusion	 occurs	when	 “prior	
adoption	 of	 a	 trait	 or	 practice	 in	 a	 population	 alters	 the	 probability	 of	 adoption	 for	
remaining	 non‐adopters.”9Solingen	 presents	 a	 more	 detailed	 conceptualisation	 of	
diffusion	as	a	process	with	four	dimensions:	(1)	the	stimuli,	or	a	triggering	event,	(2)	a	
medium,	which	is	the	context	or	milieu	through	which	the	initial	stimuli	may	travel,	(3)	
social	agents	affected	by	the	stimuli,	who	aid	or	block	the	effects	as	they	travel	to	other	
destinations,	 and	 (4)	outcomes	 that	 enable	 differentiation	 between	 several	 degrees	 of	
diffusion.10			
The	 literature	 underlines	 various	 causal	 mechanisms	 of	 diffusion,	 including	
learning,	emulation,	persuasion,	coercion,	signalling,	competition,	socialisation,	shaming,	
bargaining,	and	manipulation	of	utility	calculations.11	This	list	reflects	an	implicit	debate	
over	the	 level	of	 intentionality	associated	with	diffusion.	Some	scholars,	such	as	Elkins	
and	Simmons,	argue	that	diffusion	is	distinctive	in	that	the	prior	adopter	does	not	intend	
the	 export	 of	 policies	 or	 ideas	 to	 others.12 	Others	 focused	 on	 active	 coercive	
mechanisms—including	 imposition,	 coercion,	 and	 conditionality.13	This	 article	 takes	 a	
middle	ground	between	these	two	positions.	On	the	one	hand,	“change	agents”14—or	the	
stimuli	 in	 Solingen’s	 words—can	 intentionally	 seek	 to	 disseminate	 autocratic	 policies	
through	vertical	 linkage.	On	 the	other,	 recipients	 are	 “social	 agents”	who	 can	block	or	
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allow	this	dissemination	to	travel.15		
The	literature	has,	however,	concentrated	on	“diffusion”	as	a	process	rather	than	
an	 outcome.16	Diffusion	 is	 seen	 as	 the	 process	 conducive	 to	 the	 spread	 particular	
policies,	 ideas,	and	behaviour.	Hence,	diffusion	is	not	equivalent	to	“convergence,”	 that	
is,	the	increase	in	policy	similarities	across	actors.17	Nevertheless,	the	literature	has	not	
provided	 a	 systematic	 explanation	 of	 the	 variation	 in	 (non‐)convergence	 within	 the	
diffusion	 process.18	Despite	 the	 presence	 of	 similar	 mechanisms	 of	 diffusion,	 there	 is	
little	knowledge	as	to	why	some	actors	adopt	diffused	policies	whereas	others	refrain.		
The	motives	driving	authoritarian	regimes	to	adopt	diffused	policies	are	subject	
to	disagreement.	From	a	realist	perspective,	authoritarian	regimes	are	rationalist	actors	
driven	by	self‐regarding	 interests.	Henceforth,	authoritarian	regimes	converge	 in	 their	
policies	 when	 they	 share	 similar	 threats.	 Odinius	 and	 Kuntz19	explain	 the	 conditions	
under	 which	 states	 decide	 to	 support	 fellow	 autocrats	 through	 counter‐diffusion	
policies.	 Drawing	 on	 poliheuristic	 foreign	 policy	 analysis,	 they	 hypothesize	 that	 if	
regimes	perceive	 the	situation	 in	other	authoritarian	countries	as	similar	 to	 their	own	
domestic	 situation,	 they	 are	 likely	 to	 undertake	 policies	 shoring	 up	 those	 regimes.	
Henceforth,	 they	 explain	 why	 Gulf	 Cooperation	 Council	 (GCC	 thereafter)	 countries	
supported	 authoritarian	 regimes	 in	 Tunisia,	 Egypt,	 and	 Bahrain	 while	 supporting	
revolutionary	movements	Libya	and	Syria.	Weyland	employs	causal	mechanisms	based	
on	 bounded	 rationality	 to	 examine	 leaders’	 perceptions	 of	 threat	 from	 revolutionary	
waves	 in	Europe	during	 the	 inter‐war	period	and	 in	Latin	American	during	 the	1960s	
and	1970s,	which	explains	the	spread	of	counter‐diffusion	policies	in	these	cases.20	Yet,	
the	 designation	 of	 the	 MB	 in	 Egypt	 as	 a	 terrorist	 organisation	 and	 the	 diffusion	 of	
repression	in	the	region	challenges	this	realist	perspective.	Although	Jordan,	Kuwait,	and	
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Bahrain	shared	Saudi	regional	 interests	 in	overthrowing	the	MB	in	Egypt,	 they	did	not	
follow	in	adopting	the	terrorist	designation	in	their	own	domestic	spheres.	
Other	 scholars	 argue	 that	 ideologies	 are	 the	 main	 drivers	 of	 state	 behaviour.	
Ideology	 is	 defined	 as	 “leaders’	 preferences	 for	 ordering	 the	 political	 world,	 both	
domestically	 and	 internationally.	 Hence,	 ideologies	 are	 the	 idiosyncratic	 political	
principles	and	goals	that	leaders	both	value	most	highly	and	use	to	legitimate	their	claim	
to	 rule.”21	Some	 scholars	 argue	 that	 ideology	 is	 the	 driver	 behind	 the	 diffusion	 of	
autocratic	 policies.	 Vanderhill	 argues	 that	 ideological	 agreement	 as	 well	 as	 shared	
historical	 and	 cultural	 experiences	 affect	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 autocratic	 elites	 are	
receptive	 to	 external	 pressure	 for	 policy	 convergence.22	Accordingly,	 actors	 with	
ideological	 affinities	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 converge	 in	 their	 autocratic	 policies.	 The	
diffusion	 of	 repressive	 policies	 against	 the	 MB,	 however,	 challenges	 this	 argument.	
Although	 Kuwait,	 Jordan,	 and	 Bahrain	 share	 with	 Saudi	 Arabia	 a	monarchical	 regime	
type,	 their	 ideological	 affinities	 have	 not	 led	 to	 a	 policy	 convergence	 towards	 the	
Brotherhood.	 Furthermore,	 Saudi	 Arabia	 and	 Qatar	 share	 strands	 of	 Sunni	 Islam.	 Yet,	
they	diverged	on	policy	choices	towards	the	MB.	
In	the	remainder	of	this	article,	I	present	a	theoretical	framework	to	explain	the	
variation	in	the	recipient	states’	convergence	with	Saudi	policies.	I	argue	that	recipient	
countries	are	motivated	by	regime	 interest;	 that	 is,	 I	highlight	 the	 interaction	between	
regional	and	domestic	constraints.	I	then	explore	how	the	Saudi	Kingdom	has	played	the	
role	 of	 an	 autocratic	 regional	 power	 in	 promoting	 repression	 against	 the	 MB	 threat	
through	 external	 pressure	 and	 enticement.	 I	 finally	 investigate	 how	 recipients	 have	
diverged	between	subsequent	adopters	and	resisters.		
Explaining	Autocratic	(Non)convergence	
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A	Neoclassical	Realist	Approach	
The	 designation	 of	 the	MB	 as	 a	 terrorist	 organisation	 across	 the	 region	 constitutes	 a	
good	 illustration	 where	 autocratic	 diffusion	 has	 resulted	 in	 the	 convergence	 of	
repression	 in	 some	 cases	 but	 not	 in	 others.	 In	 order	 to	 unpack	 the	 decision‐making	
process	 leading	 to	 convergence	 in	 repression,	 this	 section	 presents	 a	 theoretical	
framework	 that	 explores	 how	 regimes	 react	 when	 they	 are	 under	 pressure	 from	
regional	powers	to	adopt	repression	in	their	domestic	sphere.		
I	 propose	 a	 theoretical	 framework	 based	 on	 NCR,	 combining	 insights	 from	 IR	
theory	and	foreign	policy	analysis.23	Rose	defines	NCR	as	an	approach	that:	
explicitly	incorporates	both	external	and	internal	variables,	updating	and	systematising	
certain	insights	drawn	from	classical	realist	thought.	Its	adherents	argue	that	the	scope	
and	ambition	of	a	country’s	foreign	policy	is	driven	first	and	foremost	by	its	place	in	the	
international	 system	and	specifically	by	 its	 relative	material	power	capabilities.	This	 is	
why	 they	 are	 realist.	 They	 argue	 further,	 however,	 that	 the	 impact	 of	 such	 power	
capabilities	on	foreign	policy	is	 indirect	and	complex,	because	systemic	pressures	must	
be	translated	through	intervening	variables	at	the	unit	level.24	
In	 examining	 the	 decision‐making	 context	 in	 which	 authoritarian	 regimes	 decide	
whether	 to	 converge	 or	 not	 with	 the	 regional	 autocratic	 power,	 this	 framework	
combines	 three	 steps	 in	 a	 causal	 chain:	 material	 interests	 at	 the	 regional	 level	
(independent	 variable),	 domestic	 level	 structures	 (intervening	 variable),	 and	 policy	
choice	 (the	 outcome	 of	 diffusion).	 Hence,	 the	 behaviour	 of	 autocratic	 regimes,	 when	
faced	 with	 external	 pressures	 from	 a	 regional	 autocratic	 power,	 is	 the	 result	 of	 the	
interaction	between:	(1)	the	dependence	on	regional	powers	 in	the	pursuit	of	regional	
interests	and	(2)	the	autonomy	of	the	ruling	elite	from	societal	groups.		
The	first	stage	in	the	argument	is	the	relative	power	of	the	state	within	the	region,	
which	 determines	 its	 responsiveness	 to	 external	 pressures.	 Autocratic	 regimes	 are	
driven	 by	 motives	 pertaining	 to	 security	 against	 threats	 within	 and	 without.	 Regime	
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survival	can	be	driven	by	geopolitical	 interests,	such	as	maintaining	the	security	of	the	
state	against	external	threats	and	preventing	spillovers	threatening	domestic	stability.25	
Authoritarian	 regimes	 are	 seeking	 survival	 in	 an	 unfavourable	 regional	 environment,	
while	 facing	external	 and	 internal	 threats.	The	 regional	 structure	provides	 states	with	
opportunities	and	constraints	and,	hence,	shapes	their	interests,	which	are	related	to	the	
capabilities	 and	 the	 relative	 power	distribution.	Authoritarian	 regimes	 can	depend	on	
their	own	resources	 to	secure	 their	 interests	and	survival,	but	 they	can	rely	on	others	
through	alliances	and	foreign	aid.		
The	 second	 element	 in	 this	 causal	 chain	 is	 the	 domestic	 intervening	 variable,	
which	 specifies	 how	 systemic	 pressures	 are	 translated	 into	 policy	 choices.	 Although	
states	may	share	converging	interests	at	the	regional	level,	they	can	undertake	divergent	
foreign	 policy	 choices.	 The	 consideration	 of	 domestic	 processes	 as	 filters	 between	
systemic	 pressures	 and	 policy	 choices	 goes	 a	 long	 way	 towards	 explaining	 diffusion	
outcomes.	 I	 argue	 here	 that	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 governing	 coalition	 and	 the	 regime	
autonomy	vis‐à‐vis	domestic	groups	matter.26	Monarchies,	like	all	authoritarian	regimes,	
rest	 upon	 a	winning	 coalition	 that	 is	 linking	 social	 constituencies	 to	 the	 ruling	 family.	
The	 regime	 autonomy,	 I	 argue,	 rests	 upon	 the	 institutional	 structure	 of	 the	 regime’s	
coalitional	 commitment.	 Different	 paths	 of	 state	 formation	 led	 to	 various	 institutional	
outcomes	in	the	Middle	East.	27	Whereas	rulers	can	either	supress	or	destroy	opposition	
groups	and	maintain	a	very	exclusive	narrow	coalition,	as	in	Saudi	Arabia.	In	other	cases,	
the	 ruling	 elite	 is	 a	 broader,	 inclusive	 coalition,	 which	 allows	 social	 groups	 a	 limited	
freedom	of	manoeuvre	 in	 the	political	process,	 either	 in	a	weak	parliament	or	a	party	
system,	as	in	Kuwait	and	Jordan.	
This	 regime	 relative	 autonomy	 can	 affect	 the	 pursuit	 of	 regional	 interests.28	
Regimes’	reaction	to	the	diffusion	of	repression	is	the	result	of	interaction	between	their	
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regional	 interests	 and	 domestic	 structures.	 If	 regimes	 rest	 upon	 an	 exclusive	 ruling	
coalition	 allowing	 a	 relative	 autonomy	 vis‐à‐vis	 the	 society,	 they	 are	 likely	 to	 adopt	
repression	at	 the	domestic	 level	 to	 ensure	 their	 regional	 interests.	When	 regimes	 are,	
however,	dependent	on	broader	ruling	coalition	making	them	less	autonomous	vis‐à‐vis	
the	 society,	 they	 are	 likely	 to	 resist	 the	 diffusion	 of	 repression	 while	 risking	 their	
regional	 interests.	 Adopting	 repressive	 policies	 can	 endanger	 the	 coalitional	
commitment	 that	 guarantees	 the	 regime	 survival.	 In	 this	 case,	 the	 logic	 of	 regime	
survival	is	likely	to	take	precedence	over	regional	economic	profits	or	interests.	
To	illustrate	this	argument,	I	examine	the	cases	of	(non‐)convergence	of	Kuwait,	
Bahrain,	Jordan,	and	the	UAE	with	Saudi	repression	towards	the	MB.	The	selection	of	the	
cases	recipient	of	diffusion	is	based	on	the	variation	within	the	dependent	variable	(i.e.	
outcome	 of	 diffusion).	Whereas	 Kuwait,	 Bahrain,	 and	 Jordan	 abstained	 from	 adopting	
repressive	policies	despite	their	linkage	with	the	Saudi	Kingdom,	the	UAE	followed	the	
Saudi	path.	To	unpack	the	intervening	variables	leading	to	various	diffusion	outcomes,	I	
chose	these	cases	as	they	share	antecedent	conditions—such	as	strong	linkage	with	the	
Saudi	Kingdom,	 the	monarchical	regime	type,	 shared	regional	 interest,	and	a	domestic	
opposition	 constituted	 of	MB	offshoot.	Hence,	 the	 case	 studies	 are	 “heuristic	 cases,”	29	
which	are	selected	based	on	the	variation	in	the	dependent	variable	to	serve	the	purpose	
of	 identifying	the	causal	path	leading	to	different	outcomes.	Other	monarchies	that	did	
not	 share	 these	 initial	 conditions	do	not	 fit	 the	scope	of	 the	study.	Qatar,	 for	example,	
challenged	the	Saudi	Kingdom	regionally	and	did	not	share	the	same	regional	interest	in	
undermining	the	MB	in	Egypt.	
The	 following	 section	 examines	 the	 role	 of	 Saudi	 Arabia	 in	 pressuring	 other	
regimes	to	adopt	repression	against	 the	MB	in	their	own	domestic	spheres.	 I	will	 then	
use	this	theoretical	framework	to	examine	how	various	states	in	the	region	responded	to	
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Saudi	diffusion.	
Saudi	Arabia:	An	Aspiring	Authoritarian	Regional	Power		
Following	 the	overthrow	of	President	Morsi,30	the	military	regime	 in	Egypt	 legitimised	
its	 crackdown	 on	 the	 MB	 through	 portraying	 the	 group	 as	 radical,	 threatening	 the	
existence	of	 the	Egyptian	state.	On	24	 July	2013,	General	al‐Sissi	 stated	 that	 “[the	MB]	
are	some	who	want	to	take	the	country	to	a	critical	curve.”31	This	narrative	culminated	
with	 the	 formal	 designation	 of	 the	 Brotherhood	 as	 a	 terrorist	 organisation	 on	 25	
December	 2013,	 which	 successfully	 mobilised	 the	 people	 behind	 the	 regime.32	On	 7	
March	2014,	the	Saudi	Kingdom	declared	the	group	to	be	a	terrorist	organisation.	33	This	
declaration	 had	 regional	 reverberations	 since	 the	 Saudi	 Kingdom	 aimed	 at	 building	 a	
coalition	 to	 eradicate	 the	 MB	 across	 the	 region.	 Despite	 the	 assumption	 that	 Saudi	
Arabia	 is	 promoting	 autocracy	 in	 the	Middle	 East,34	its	 regional	 policies,	 especially	 in	
diffusing	repression	against	the	MB,	fit	what	Tansey	calls	‘democracy	resistance’.35	This	
Saudi	endeavour	can	be	regarded	as	an	act	shaped	by	the	combination	of	the	Kingdom’s	
geopolitical	 interests	and	 its	 fear	of	 the	 rise	of	 the	MB	as	an	 ideological	 competitor	 in	
Egypt,	threatening	the	Saudi	acclaimed	Sunni	leadership	in	the	region.		
Following	 the	 2011	 uprisings,	 Saudi	 Arabia	 emerged	 as	 the	 primary	 counter‐
revolutionary	force	in	the	region.36	Saudi	efforts	in	building	a	regional	coalition	against	
the	 MB	 under	 its	 leadership	 highlighted	 the	 Kingdom’s	 role	 as	 an	 aspiring	 regional	
power.	The	roots	of	this	behaviour	can	be	traced	back	to	the	pre‐2011	period.	Following	
the	2003	Iraq	War,	the	regional	balance	of	power	demonstrated	an	unprecedented	Arab	
weakness.	Iraq’s	military	power	faded,	leaving	a	void	that	several	countries	competed	to	
fill.	 Two	 regional	 blocs	 emerged.	 The	 first	 includes,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 so‐called	
“Resistance	Axis”	based	on	an	alliance	between	Iran,	Syria,	Hezbollah,	and	Hamas.	The	
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second	 evolved	 as	 the	 Saudis	 attempted	 to	bolster	 alliances	with	 Jordan	 and	Egypt	 to	
craft	 a	 countering	 axis,	 in	 response	 to	 what	 the	 Saudi	 Kingdom	 perceived	 as	 Iranian	
ambitions.37	With	 the	 outbreak	 of	 the	 2011	 uprisings	 in	 Egypt,	 Bahrain,	 Yemen,	 and	
Syria,	and	the	on‐going	instability	in	Iraq,	Riyadh	found	itself	surrounded	by	instability.	
The	 Kingdom	 perceived	 its	 network	 of	 allies—upon	 which	 it	 relied	 to	 ensure	 its	
geopolitical	 interests—collapsing.	The	Saudis	perceived	the	rise	of	 the	MB	to	power	 in	
Egypt	as	a	threat	to	their	claims	of	Sunni	leadership.38	
Regime	 change,	 shifting	 alliance,	 and	 the	 prominence	 of	 non‐state	 actors	
contributed	 to	 Saudi	 Arabia’s	 struggle	 to	 ensure	 that	 regional	 changes	 are	 serving	 its	
geopolitical	 interests.39	The	 Kingdom’s	 reliance	 on	 international	 allies	 to	 preserve	 its	
security	and	pursue	its	regional	interests	was	also	endangered.	Since	its	foundation,	the	
Kingdom	relied	on	external	powers	for	security—first	the	British,	then	the	United	States	
(US).	Since	2011,	the	Saudis	became	convinced	that	the	divergence	between	Riyadh	and	
Washington	 over	 the	 intended	 post‐2011	 regional	 order	 has	 hindered	 the	 Kingdom’s	
regional	interests.	Following	the	US	reluctance	to	intervene	in	Syria	and	their	favourable	
policy	 toward	 Iran,	 the	 Kingdom	 discarded	 its	 traditional	 defence	 doctrine	 and	
attempted	 to	 rely	on	 its	 own	 resources	 for	 security.40	As	 the	US	 seemed	 to	be	moving	
along	with	an	Iranian	nuclear	deal	despite	Saudi	concerns,	the	Kingdom	needed	regional	
allies.		
Nonetheless,	 Saudi	 Arabia’s	 attempts	 to	 build	 regional	 coalitions	 under	 its	
leadership	did	not	have	the	desired	result.	In	the	Gulf,	the	Saudis	insisted	on	deepening	
the	GCC	unity	and	institutionalisation.	On	numerous	occasions,	the	Saudis	proposed	the	
institutionalisation	of	 an	 expanded,	 tighter	union	 for	 the	GCC	under	 their	 command.41	
However,	King	Abdullah’s	proposals	for	political	integration	in	the	Gulf	collapsed	in	the	
	 13	
face	of	Oman’s	opposition	and	Kuwait’s	 reluctance.	 In	December	2013,	Oman	opposed	
Saudi	 plans	 for	 a	 unified	 command	 structure	 for	 the	 armed	 forces	 of	 the	 six	 states.42	
Kuwait	 refused	 to	 sign	 a	 GCC	 internal	 security	 pact,	 as	 it	 compromises	 its	 political	
liberalism	and	exceptional	constitutional	principles	within	the	Gulf.43	The	emergence	of	
Qatari‐Emirati	 animosity	 over	 Libya	 and	 the	 MB	 in	 Egypt	 made	 Saudi	 ambitions	 of	
leading	a	regional	coalition	unattainable.44		
The	 Saudi	 attempt	 to	 build	 new	 alliances	 under	 the	 Kingdom’s	 leadership	 to	
balance	Iran	also	foundered.45	Iranian	influence	in	Iraq,	Syria,	and	Lebanon	exposed	the	
Kingdom’s	 failure	 in	 acting	 as	 a	 regional	 power	 able	 to	 influence	 regional	 outcomes.	
Relying	 on	 its	 Islamic	 identity,	 the	 Kingdom	 sought	 to	 place	 itself	 at	 the	 centre	 of	 a	
regional	coalition	to	counter	its	long‐lived	enemy,	Iran.	Despite	this,	all	Gulf	states	except	
Saudi	Arabia	and	Bahrain	approved	the	interim	nuclear	agreement	between	the	US	and	
Iran	 in	 November	 2013. 46 	Furthermore,	 Oman	 secretly	 hosted	 the	 preliminary	
negotiations	 between	 Iran	 and	 the	 US.	 Turkey,	 which	 seemed	 a	 natural	member	 of	 a	
coalition	against	Iran,	challenged	the	Saudi	Kingdom’s	policies	towards	the	MB	in	Egypt.	
This	disagreement	over	the	MB	made	an	alliance	with	Turkey	unattainable.	
Henceforth,	the	Saudis	saw	in	the	coup	d’état	in	Egypt	an	opportunity	to	overthrow	
the	 MB,	 and	 to	 form	 a	 regional	 coalition	 fostering	 the	 Kingdom’s	 supremacy	 in	 the	
region.	As	the	Kingdom	accumulated	significant	 financial	and	military	capabilities	over	
the	decades,	 it	 sought	a	more	 favourable	 regional	balance	of	power	based	on	“patron‐
client”	 relationships.47	Accordingly,	 the	 Saudi	 Kingdom	 expanded	 its	 financial	 and	
military	 resources	 to	 support	 authoritarian	 regimes,	who	 later	 became	 the	Kingdom’s	
loyal	 allies.	 Noteworthy,	 Saudi	 efforts	 of	 authoritarian	 diffusion	 is	 driven	 by	 interests	
rather	 than	 an	 overarching	 ideological	 project.	 This	 logic	 is	manifest	 in	 Saudi	 tactical	
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shifts	 towards	 the	MB	 in	Yemen.	 In	 its	war	against	 the	Houthis,	 the	Saudis	allied	with	
other	groups,	including	al‐Islah	party,	an	MB	offshoot	in	Yemen.48		
Using	 its	 financial	 capabilities	 to	 promote	 authoritarian	 survival,	 the	 Kingdom	
emerged	 as	 an	 authoritarian	 regional	 patron	 encouraging	 its	 clients	 to	 outlaw	 the	
Brotherhood	 in	 their	 respective	 countries,	 pursuing	 active	 and	 deliberate	 policies	 to	
achieve	 this	outcome	 through	enticements	 and	pressure.	 In	March	2014,	 Saudi	Arabia	
withdrew	 its	 ambassador	 from	 Doha	 over	 anger	 at	 Qatar’s	 support	 for	 the	MB.49	The	
Saudis	exercised	an	unprecedented	amount	of	pressure	on	Kuwait,	 Jordan,	Syria,	 even	
the	United	Kingdom	and	France	to	criminalise	the	MB	as	terrorist.50		
Saudi	efforts	to	spread	repression	against	the	MB	across	the	region	constituted	a	
case	 of	 vertical	 diffusion	 pressuring	 other	 states	 to	 follow	 its	 lead.	 The	 Saudi	 built	
patron‐client	 relationships	 with	 other	 authoritarian	 regimes	 through	 foreign	 aid	
(Jordan),	 military	 support	 (Bahrain),	 or	 linkage	 due	 to	 geographic	 proximity	 (Kuwait	
and	 the	 UAE).	 This	 process	 of	 autocratic	 diffusion	 resulted	 in	 policy	 convergence	 for	
some	 cases	 (UAE)	 but	 not	 for	 others	 (Kuwait,	 Bahrain,	 and	 Jordan).	 The	 next	 section	
examines	how	recipient	states	responded	to	this	vertical	diffusion.	
Autocratic	(Non‐)convergence	
Following	 the	 Saudi	 designation	 of	 the	 MB	 as	 terrorist,	 the	 UAE	 pronounced	 the	
Brotherhood’s	local	affiliates	to	be	terrorist	on	15	November	2014.	In	contrast,	despite	
economic	 linkage	 and	 the	 convergence	 of	 interests	 with	 the	 strongest	 regional	
authoritarian	 power,	 Bahrain,	 Morocco,	 Jordan,	 and	 Kuwait	 resisted	 the	 adoption	 of	
repressive	 policies	 against	 the	 MB	 at	 home.	 These	 cases	 highlight	 the	 interaction	
between	regime	interests	and	domestic	constraints	in	varying	diffusion	outcomes.		
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The	 UAE’s	 decision	 was	 driven	 by	 regional	 interests	 as	 well	 as	 domestic	
structures.	 In	 the	past	 decade,	 changes	 in	 leadership	 led	 to	 substantial	 changes	 in	 the	
monarchy’s	 foreign	 behaviour.	 Although	 the	 founding	 ruler	 of	 the	UAE,	 Sheikh	 Zayed,	
relied	 on	 oil	 wealth	 to	 consolidate	 the	 confederation	 of	 the	 seven	 emirates,	 his	 son	
Sheikh	Mohamed	bin	Zayed	developed	a	regional	role	for	the	UAE.	The	state	emerged	as	
a	donor	across	the	region,51	aiming	at	acquiring	a	regional	status	and	a	power	projection	
force	 through	 bombing	 targets	 in	 Libya,	 participating	 in	 the	 air	 campaign	 against	 the	
Islamic	State,	and	supporting	the	Syrian	opposition	against	Bashar	al‐Assad.52	Moreover,	
the	UAE	acted	as	a	Saudi	ally	in	its	rivalry	with	Iran.	As	Sheikh	Abdullah	bin	Zayed	the	
UAE	foreign	minister	stressed:	“The	UAE	stands	firmly	with	the	Kingdom	of	Saudi	Arabia	
in	 opposition	 to	 any	 Iranian	 attempts	 to	 interfere	 in	 the	 internal	 affairs	 of	 the	 Arab	
states.”53		
Following	 the	 2011	 uprisings,	 this	 alliance	 between	 Saudi	 Arabia	 and	 the	 UAE	
manifested	 itself	 in	 Bahrain,	 Yemen,	 Syria,	 and	 Egypt.	 Joining	 Saudi	 Arabia	 in	 the	
repression	of	 the	MB	contributed	 to	 the	UAE’s	 regional	 interests,	 furthering	 its	power	
and	 status.	 Since	 the	 overthrow	 of	 the	 MB	 in	 Egypt,	 the	 UAE	 emerged	 as	 one	 of	 the	
financial	supporters	of	the	al‐Sissi’s	regime,	and	the	designation	of	the	group	as	terrorist	
conforms	 to	 its	 regional	 interests.	Although	Sheikh	Zayed	 tolerated	 the	MB’s	presence	
through	 the	 al‐Islah	 group	 for	 decades,	 the	 group	 had	 little	 impact	 on	 the	 regime’s	
domestic	legitimacy.	Since	2013,	the	UAE	organised	a	regional	campaign	against	the	MB,	
portraying	 it	as	a	 transnational	 threat	 to	regional	and	domestic	security.	Furthermore,	
the	UAE,	alongside	Saudi	Arabia,	exercised	pressure	over	other	countries	to	crack	down	
on	 the	 MB,	 including	 the	 UK.54	In	 short,	 the	 UAE’s	 decision	 was	 far	 motivated	 by	
ideological	 animosity	with	 the	MB.	 Instead,	 its	 regional	 interests	 played	 the	dominant	
role	in	the	decision.		
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In	contrast,	although	Bahrain,	Kuwait,	and	Jordan	expressed	their	support	for	the	
al‐Sissi	repression	of	the	MB,	they	resisted	the	emulation	of	repression	at	home.	The	MB	
has	political	offshoots	across	the	Middle	East,	such	as	the	Islamic	Action	Front	(IAF)	in	
Jordan	and	the	Islamic	Constitutional	Movement	(ICM)	in	Kuwait.55	Nevertheless,	these	
regimes	resisted	the	designation	of	their	countries’	respective	movements	as	terrorist.	
Bahrain	
With	the	protests	in	Manama	in	February	2011,	the	wave	of	uprisings	calling	for	political	
reforms	 reached	 the	 first	Gulf	monarchy.	 Initially,	 the	 protestors	 represented	 a	 cross‐
sectarian	 appeal	 against	 the	 regime.	 However,	 the	 regime	 portrayed	 these	 protests	
through	a	sectarian	lens	and	branded	them	as	Iranian	attempts	to	destabilize	the	region.	
As	the	al‐Khalifa	regime	was	unable	to	suppress	the	protesters,	it	turned	to	the	GCC	for	
support.	On	14	March	2011,	Saudi	Arabia	sent	1200	armed	forces	personnel	to	Manama,	
who	cleared	the	demonstrators	from	the	Pearl	roundabout.	Furthermore,	the	Kingdom	
committed	 to	 the	 security	 of	 the	 al‐Khalifa	 regime	 in	 the	 form	 of	 a	 US$	 500	 million	
donation.56	
Since	 then,	 the	 relationship	between	Bahrain	and	Saudi	Arabia	became	an	ever	
closer	alliance.	In	return	for	Saudi	support,	the	al‐Khalifa	remains	the	Saudis’	strongest	
follower.	Following	their	intervention,	the	regime	survival	depended	on	the	flow	of	aid	
and	military	support	from	the	Saudi	Kingdom,	which	shaped	Bahrain’s	regional	interest.	
Yet,	 this	 interest	did	not	 lead	 the	Bahrainis	 to	 follow	the	Saudi	 lead	 in	designating	 the	
MB’s	local	group	as	terrorist,	an	outcome	driven	by	domestic	considerations.	Indeed,	the	
MB	in	Bahrain,	represented	by	the	“Islamic	Minbar,”	constitutes	a	crucial	ally	to	the	al‐
Khalifa	regime.	Alongside	other	Salafi	groups,	the	Islamic	Minbar	joined	a	national	unity	
front	 to	 stabilize	 the	 regime	 during	 the	 uprisings.	 Following	 the	 suppression	 of	 the	
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opposition,	the	ruling	family	in	Bahrain	sought	to	strengthen	its	ties	with	Sunni	Islamist	
movements,	including	the	MB,	to	balance	the	so‐called	“Shiite”	protests.		
As	the	Saudis	called	its	ally	to	build	a	regional	coalition	against	the	Brotherhood,	
Bahrain	was	torn	between	satisfying	its	external	supporter	and	maintaining	a	domestic	
ally.	This	struggle	was	manifest	 in	 the	public	 statements	of	Bahrain’s	Foreign	Minister	
Khalid	bin	Ahmed	al‐Khalifa.	Following	the	Saudi	designation	of	the	MB	as	terrorist,	he	
commented	 that	 his	 government	 will	 not	 label	 the	 Islamic	 Minbar	 as	 a	 terrorist	
organisation.	 He	 distinguished	 between	 the	 international	 organisation	 and	 the	 local	
branch	in	Bahrain	and	explained	that	“the	MB	have	a	particular	status	in	Bahrain.”57	As	
this	 statement	 led	 to	 Saudi	 disappointment,	 Bahrain’s	 foreign	 minister	 justified	 the	
regime’s	 position:	 “The	Muslim	 Brotherhood	movement	 is	 a	 global	movement	 with	 a	
single	approach	and	is	spread	throughout	the	world,	and	will	be	dealt	with	according	to	
the	 law	 of	 each	 country	 and	 the	 covenants	 to	 which	 it	 is	 party.”58	Following	 Saudi	
pressure,	Bahrain	announced	 its	support	 to	 the	Saudis	and	the	UAE	in	 fighting	the	MB	
across	 the	 region.	 Foreign	 Minister	 Khalid	 al‐Khalifa	 insisted	 in	 several	 tweets	 that	
Bahrain	fully	supported	Saudi	Arabia	and	the	UAE,	stressing	that	any	threat	to	the	GCC	
fellows	 was	 a	 threat	 to	 Bahrain.	 However,	 the	 al‐Khalifa	 regime	 remained,	 however,	
unwilling	 to	 list	 the	 Islamic	 Minbar	 group	 as	 terrorist.59	It	 is	 therefore	 clear	 that	
Bahrain’s	 regional	 interest	 emerged	 from	 its	 linkage	 with	 the	 Saudi	 Kingdom,	 which	
guaranteed	 its	 regime	 survival,	 and	 the	MB	 did	 not	 pose	 an	 ideological	 threat	 to	 the	
Bahraini	regime.	Nevertheless,	the	regime	was	willing	to	take	a	regional	position	against	
the	MB	elsewhere,	just	not	at	home.	
Jordan	
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The	Hashemite	Kingdom	of	Jordan	is	a	small	state	endeavouring	to	survive	domestic	and	
regional	threats.60	Jordan	often	relied	on	external	economic	and	financial	support	from	
the	Gulf	states	and	the	US.	 Jordan	found	its	regional	 interests	converging	with	the	Gulf	
states	 in	 counterbalancing	 Iran	 and	 leading	 counter‐diffusion	 policies	 against	
revolutionary	 changes	 in	 2011	 to	maintain	 regional	 allies.	 Jordan’s	 constant	 need	 for	
external	 aid	 and,	 therefore,	 affluent	 regional	 allies	 constituted	 a	 systemic	 pressure	
influencing	its	foreign	and	domestic	policy	choices.	Although	Jordan’s	regional	interests	
converged	with	Saudi	ones	 in	supporting	the	coup	d’état	 in	Egypt,	 the	structure	of	 the	
ruling	 coalition	 and	 its	 interaction	 with	 the	 local	 MB	 led	 to	 the	 country’s	 non‐
convergence	with	repressive	policies.		
Prior	to	the	outbreak	of	the	Arab	uprisings,	 Jordan	developed	a	strong	coalition	
with	 Egypt	 and	 Saudi	 Arabia,	 which	 was	 known	 as	 “the	moderate	 axis”	 or	 the	 “Arab	
centre.”61	Following	 the	 uprisings	 in	 Egypt	 and	 Syria,	 Jordan	 attempted	 to	 foster	
alliances	 and	 security	 cooperation	with	 the	GCC.	Between	2011	 and	2013,	 over	 half	 a	
million	 refugees	 crossed	 the	 borders	 into	 Jordan	 to	 escape	 the	 Syrian	 war.	 For	 a	
resource‐poor	 country,	 Jordan	 has	 experienced	 harsh	 economic	 constraints,	 namely,	
vast	budget	deficits	as	a	result	of	the	compliance	with	the	International	Monetary	Fund,	
which	led	to	riots	in	November	2012.62	For	Jordan,	maintaining	the	flow	of	cash	coming	
from	rich	aid	donors,	namely	Saudi	Arabia,	Kuwait,	and	the	UAE,	became	the	priority	for	
regime	security.63	Therefore,	 the	 threat	of	 an	 ideational	diffusion	 from	 the	MB	did	not	
constitute	an	ultimate	threat,	considering	the	internal	weakness	of	the	group.	
Jordan’s	 position	 toward	 the	 new	 regime	 in	 Egypt	 and	 the	 fall	 of	 the	 MB	was	
delicate.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 Jordan’s	 interest	was	 to	maintain	 the	Gulf	 aid	while	 giving	
impetus	 to	 the	new	regime	 in	Egypt	 to	re‐establish	 the	so‐called	“moderate	axis.”	This	
interest	 was	 evident	 in	 King	 Abdullah	 II’s	 personal	 visit	 to	 Cairo	 after	 the	 ouster	 of	
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President	Morsi,	endorsing	the	new	regime	and	re‐establishing	a	close	relationship	with	
Egypt.64	
Following	 Saudi	 and	 Emirati	 designations	 of	 the	 Brotherhood	 as	 a	 terrorist	
organisation,	rumours	spread	that	the	two	Gulf	states	pressured	Jordan	to	adopt	similar	
repressive	 policies.65	Although	 such	 policies	 could	 satisfy	 Jordan’s	 regional	 interest,	 it	
would	be	costly	to	the	country’s	domestic	stability.	The	structure	of	the	ruling	coalition	
and	its	inclusive	nature	allowing	close	relations	with	societal	groups	led	to	Jordan’s	non‐
convergence	 with	 Saudi	 repressive	 policies.	 Historically,	 the	 Jordanian	 MB—through	
their	 political	 party	 the	 Islamic	 Action	 Front	 (IAF)—acted	 as	 a	 “loyal	 opposition,”	
requesting	 reforms	 but	 generally	 co‐opted	 by	 the	 royal	 palace	 until	 1993.66	With	 the	
peace	treaty	with	Israel,	this	implicit	alliance	collapsed.	Despite	the	tension	between	the	
group	and	the	regime,	the	monarchy	gives	the	MB	the	space	to	operate	alongside	other	
societal	 groups.67	In	March	2015,	 an	 internal	 crisis	within	 the	MB	 in	 Jordan	 led	 to	 the	
split	of	the	group	into	two	movements;	some	members	of	the	group,	led	by	Abdul‐Majid	
Thunaibat,	submitted	an	application	to	register	an	alternative	MB	in	Jordan.	In	this	crisis	
and	with	the	rise	of	contending	Salafi	voices	within	the	monarchy,	 the	regime	avoided	
weakening	the	MB	and	maintained	a	dialogue	open	with	at	least	one	of	the	movement’s	
branches.68	Any	 weakening	 of	 the	 existing	 Brotherhood	 could	 destabilize	 Jordan	 by	
prompting	 the	 rise	 of	 alternative	movements	 that	 are	 less	 pragmatic	 and	moderate.69	
The	 regime	 has	 therefore	 adopted	 a	 strategy	 combining	 integration	 and	 exclusion.	
Jordan	 did	 not	 follow	 the	 repressive	 policies	 adopted	 by	 Egypt,	 Saudi	 Arabia	 and	 the	
UAE.	Nor	did	it	integrate	the	group	and	engage	with	it	political,	as	the	Moroccan	path.	
Declaring	 the	 MB	 as	 a	 terrorist	 organisation	 could	 benefit	 Jordan’s	 regional	
interests,	but	would	risk	its	domestic	stability	by	narrowing	down	its	societal	base	and	
deepen	the	societal	ethnic	divide,	i.e.	between	Palestinians	and	Transjordanians,	which	
	 20	
might	 lead	to	destabilising	the	regime.	Therefore,	 the	regime	sought	to	please	external	
donors	 by	 weakening	 the	 MB	 using	 other	 means	 without	 banning	 it.	 When	 the	 MB	
deputy	 leader	Zaki	Bani	Arshid	attacked	 the	UAE’s	decision	 to	 list	 the	organisation	 as	
terrorist,	 the	 Jordanian	authorities	arrested	him	on	 the	charge	of	 “disrupting	relations	
with	 a	 foreign	 state.”70	The	 Jordanian	authorities	defend	 their	 actions	by	 stressing	 the	
economic	interests	that	bind	Jordan	to	the	UAE.	
Kuwait	
Although	Kuwait	is	one	of	the	major	financial	supporters	of	the	military	regime	in	Egypt,	
it	explicitly	refused	to	declare	 its	own	MB	to	be	 terrorist,	 calling	 the	Saudi	 labelling	of	
the	 group	 an	 “internal	 affair.”71	The	 local	MB	 in	 Kuwait	 is	 represented	 by	 the	 al‐Islah	
movement	and	its	political	wing,	 the	Islamic	Constitutional	Movement	(ICM,	known	by	
its	Arabic	acronym	as	Hadas).	Emerging	 initially	 in	 the	1960s,	 it	established	 itself	as	a	
political	actor	by	winning	seats	 in	 the	parliament	 following	 the	1990	 Iraqi	 invasion	of	
Kuwait.	The	ICM	has	positioned	itself	as	a	bridge	between	liberals	and	hardline	Salafis	in	
the	emirate.72	The	emergence	of	this	political	activism	was	allowed	by	the	nature	of	the	
seemingly	participatory	political	system	in	Kuwait.	
	 The	overthrow	of	Morsi	in	Egypt	and	the	crackdown	on	the	MB	across	the	region	
has	reverberated	in	Kuwait.	On	the	one	hand,	the	ICM	criticised	the	Kuwaiti	government	
for	supporting	the	military	regime	in	Egypt,	which	created	domestic	divisions.	Moreover,	
the	ICM	has	been	subject	to	criticism	from	politicians	and	public	opinion	in	Kuwait.	On	
the	other	hand,	external	pressure	from	Saudi	Arabia	and	the	UAE	for	Kuwait	to	join	the	
coalition	 intensified.	For	example,	 the	UAE	arrested	Brotherhood	members	accused	of	
plotting	against	 the	 ruling	 family	and	 linked	some	prominent	Kuwaitis	 to	 the	arrested	
group,	portraying	 the	 ICM	as	part	of	a	regional	movement	rather	 than	a	mere	Kuwaiti	
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political	 actor.73	Still,	 although	 the	 regime	 in	Kuwait,	 allied	with	 Saudi	 Arabia	 and	 the	
UAE,	supported	the	oppression	of	the	MB	in	Egypt,	it	took	a	less	repressive	stance	vis‐à‐
vis	 the	 local	MB	 due	 to	 the	 latter’s	 involvement	 in	 politics	 and	 its	 implicit	 agreement	
with	 the	regime	to	balance	 leftist	and	extremist	Salafi	groups	since	1990.	 In	short,	 the	
IMC	 is	 an	 opposition	 movement	 whose	 presence	 and	 activity	 contribute	 to	 the	
legitimacy	and	survival	of	the	al‐Sabah	regime	and	thus	could	not	be	sacrificed	to	please	
Saudi		ambitions.74	
Conclusion		
This	article	has	problematised	why	autocratic	diffusion	of	repression	processes	lead	to	
policy	 convergence	 in	 some	 cases	 but	 not	 in	 others.	 The	 existing	 literature	 is	 divided	
between	scholars	focusing	on	the	role	of	ideology	and	those	focusing	on	interests	as	the	
primary	driver	of	autocratic	behaviour.	This	article	presents	a	complex	understanding	of	
regime	interests	by	exploring	how	authoritarian	regimes	are	receptive	to	the	diffusion	of	
repression.	From	an	IR	perspective,	neorealism	argues	that	interests	evolving	from	the	
regional	 environment	 shape	 states’	 interests	 and,	 hence,	 policy	 choices	 regardless	 of	
regime	 type	 and	 domestic	 factors.	 The	 increasing	 abandonment	 of	 such	 an	 extreme	
stance	allowed	a	fruitful	engagement	between	IR	and	Comparative	Politics.	This	article	
has	 demonstrated	 that	 diffusion	 of	 repression	 is	 a	 dynamic	 process	 in	 which	
authoritarian	regime’s	 interests	are	 in	constant	 interaction	between	 its	position	 in	 the	
regional	structure	and	its	domestic	structure	enabling	or	constraining	the	pursuit	of	this	
interest	regionally.	It	thus	shows	that	variations	in	diffusion	outcomes	require	a	multi‐
level	analysis,	including	systemic	and	domestic	factors.	Henceforth,	neoclassical	realism	
constitutes	a	fertile	ground	for	theory	development	to	examine	how	autocratic	policies	
operate	at	regional	and	international	levels.		
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The	cases	of	Bahrain,	 Jordan,	and	Kuwait	show	that	 the	 interactive	dynamics	of	
regional	 interests	 and	 domestic	 structures	 led	 to	 distinct	 patterns	 of	 behaviour	 in	
reaction	to	regional	pressures	from	the	Saudi	Kingdom.	All	three	regimes	had	interests	
in	supporting	the	authoritarian	regime	in	Egypt,	such	as	regional	alliances	in	the	case	of	
Jordan	or	fear	of	revolution	as	in	the	cases	of	Kuwait	and	Bahrain.	Domestic	structures,	
however,	functioned	as	intervening	variables	making	the	pursuit	of	regime	interests	at	
the	 regional	 level	 permissible	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 UAE	 but	 unbearable	 in	 the	 cases	 of	
Bahrain,	Jordan,	and	Kuwait.	
These	empirical	cases	make	several	contributions	to	the	existing	literature	on	the	
international	 dimensions	 of	 authoritarianism.	 First,	 whereas	 scholars	 have	 broadly	
addressed	diffusion	as	an	unintentional	process,	the	case	of	Saudi	Arabia	provides	novel	
insights	on	diffusion	as	a	vertical	process	involving	external	pressure.	Second,	the	non‐
convergence	of	Saudi	clients	to	the	Kingdom’s	diffusion	efforts	showed	that	diffusion	is	a	
process	 where	 senders	 and	 recipients	 are	 independent	 agents	 able	 to	 influence	 its	
outcome.	Henceforth,	this	article	moved	beyond	the	study	of	diffusion	as	a	mechanism.	
Instead,	 diffusion	 is	 a	 process	 involving	 both	 active	 senders	 and,	 crucially,	 active	
recipients.	 Third,	 the	 cases	 of	 Bahrain	 and	 Jordan,	 in	 particular,	 show	 that	 economic	
linkage	 does	 not	 necessarily	 lead	 to	 diffusion.	 Despite	 their	 dependence	 on	 Saudi	 aid	
both	Bahrain	and	Jordan	resisted	Saudi	external	pressure.	Fourth,	this	study	illuminates	
other	cases	of	diffusion	of	autocratic	policies,	such	as	the	military	intervention	in	Yemen,	
where	Gulf	states	joined	the	Saudi‐led	coalition	except	Oman.	Also,	the	argument	sheds	
light	on	the	diffusion	of	repression	against	Shiite	communities	across	the	region.	
In	 conclusion,	 the	 analysis	of	diffusion	of	 repression	 in	 the	Middle	East	politics	
has	 theoretical	 relevance	 that	 goes	 beyond	 the	 diffusion	 literature.	 It	 shows	 that	 a	
serious	 engagement	 between	 IR	 and	 Comparative	 Politics	 can	 lead	 to	 theory	
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development.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 a	 close	 examination	 of	 authoritarian	 behaviour	 at	 the	
intersection	 of	 regional	 and	 domestic	 levels	 provides	 enlightens	 authoritarian	 foreign	
behaviour.	On	the	other	hand,	the	literature	on	autocratic	diffusion	can	benefit	from	the	
mid‐range	 theories	 developed	within	 IR	 presenting	 a	more	 nuanced	 understanding	 of	
the	ideology	versus	interest	debate.	
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Country	 Muslim	Brotherhood	Movement	
Egypt	 MB	
Political	wing:	The	Freedom	and	Justice	
Party	
Tunis	 Al‐Nahda	Party	
Kuwait	 Al‐Islah	movement	
Its	political	wing:	Islamic	Constitutional	
Movement	(ICM)	
Jordan	 The	Islamic	Action	Front	(IAF)	
UAE	 Al‐Islah	Movement	
Bahrain	 The	Islamic	Minbar	
Yemen	 MB	is	a	dominant	group	within	Al‐Islah	
Party	
	
Figure	(1):	The	MB	and	their	offshoots	in	the	Arab	world75	
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